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December 7, 1983

20 DEC 1983

Honorable William J. Casey
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Casey:

As you know, even though the SALT II Treaty remains unratified, the President's policy of not undercutting existing SALT agreements so long as the Soviet Union does the same preserves important limits on Soviet strategic forces. A major decision point for the current interim restraint policy may come as early as January, when the Fiscal Year 1985 defense budget is submitted to Congress. If the President wishes to preserve the option of maintaining his interim restraint policy on SALT II through 1985, the FY 85 defense budget should contain a request for funds to dismantle a sufficient number of MIRVed missiles to compensate for the MIRVed SLBMs to be carried on the seventh Trident submarine when it enters sea trials in 1985. If offsetting action is not taken, the United States will exceed the SALT II ceiling of 1200 on launchers of MIRVed missiles when the seventh Trident submarine goes out to sea trials.

The President's decision will have major implications for the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. It would be most helpful if you could provide me, by the time the FY 85 defense budget is submitted to Congress, with the Intelligence Community's estimate of likely Soviet reactions to a decision to terminate the current policy toward SALT II, as well as to continue it. Please include in this assessment potential Soviet actions in political relations, arms control negotiations, and strategic and intermediate range nuclear force posture and programs.

I would, of course, make this assessment available to my colleagues on the Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as any other Senator, under the usual security procedures, who should ask to see it.

Sincerely,


 PATRICK LEAHY

United States Senator